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Abstract
The BHK interpretation interprets propositional statements as de-
scriptions of the world of proofs; a world which is hierarchical in na-
ture. It consists of different layers of the concept of proof; the proofs,
the proofs about “proofs” and so on. To describe this hierarchical
world, one approach is the Russellian approach in which we use a
typed language to reflect this hierarchical nature in the syntax level.
In this case, since the connective responsible for this hierarchical be-
havior is implication, we will use a typed language equipped with a
hierarchy of implications, {→n}
∞
n=0. In fact, using this typed propo-
sitional language, we will introduce the hierarchical counterparts of
the logics BPC, EBPC, IPC and FPL and then by proving their
corresponding soundness-completeness theorems with respect to their
natural BHK interpretations, we will show how these different log-
ics describe different worlds of proofs embodying different hierarchical
behaviors.
1 Introduction
The intuitionistic tradition is based on the core concept of proof and its most
important claim is that the statements in the language are descriptions of
∗The author is supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 339691 (FEALORA)
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the world of proofs rather than the actual Platonistic world.1 Therefore, the
intended semantics of intuitionistic mathematics is just a relation which de-
scribes the way that intuitionistic logic describes the world of proofs. This
semantics has a very complicated character and resists any kind of natural
formalization. The reason is the hierarchical nature of the concept of proof
which claims that there are different layers in the world of proofs. The first
layer is the layer of proofs about the facts of the world. The second is the
level of proofs about the proofs in the first level and there are also the third
one, the fourth and so on. The important thing is that these higher level
proofs occur in a very natural way. For instance, consider the statement “A
implies B”. A proof for this statement is a proof which transforms proofs of
A to proofs for B. Hence, this proof is about proofs, meaning that it belongs
to a higher level of the levels of the proofs of A and B.
So far we have shown that the world of proofs is hierarchical in na-
ture. Therefore, like any other hierarchical phenomenon, there are two main
approaches to describe it: The Zermelo approach and the Russelian one.
The Zermelo approach uses an untyped language to investigate the orderless
propositions about the phenomenon, i.e. the propositions which are true in
the world regardless of the levels of the objects in the world. The classical
example of this approach is Zermelo’s set theory in the untyped first order
language. Although there is a canonical order in the world of sets, i.e. the
rank of sets, Zermelo’s set theory ignores this order and axiomatizes the uni-
verse uniformly.
Now, consider using the Zermelo approach for the world of proofs. We
need two different components. First, an untyped language which in this
case is the usual propositional language and second, an interpretation to in-
terpret this language as a way of describing the world of proofs. The latter
is provided by the following BHK interpretation:
• a proof for A ∧ B is a pair of a proof for A and a proof for B.
• a proof for A ∨ B is a proof for A or a proof for B.
• a proof for A→ B is a construction which transforms any proof of A to a
1Notice that our paraphrase of the intuitionistic tradition’s claim seems extremly un-
orthodox. The reason is that we refer to the Platonistic world which can not exist in
the intuitionistic terms. But it is not actually a paradox or a misinterpretation. In fact,
following Go¨del, [4], we interpret intuitionism from outside of its paradigm and we assume
that we live in a Platonistic world in which intuitionism is a way of describing the sub-
world of the classical proofs. This approach has been shown to be extremely useful. For
more discussion about this approach and other approaches, see [1].
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proof for B.
• ⊥ does not have any proof.
This approach seems natural and easy to follow. We have an untyped
simple language which is informally capable of describing the whole com-
plexity of the world of proofs. Therefore, it seems natural to try to formalize
this BHK interpretation as a formalized intended semantics for intuitionistic
mathematics. But there are some fundamental problems along the way. The
reason is that some of the most important statements in the language do
have an internal inherent order and therefore the Zermelo approach has to
ignore them; the situation which is not what we expect. Let us illuminate the
idea by an example. Consider the following theorem of IPC: (⊤ → ⊥)→ ⊥.
If we interpret this statement by the BHK interpretation, its content would
be the following: “There is a proof which shows that the provability of the
provability of ⊥ implies the provability of ⊥.” It seems that just by the in-
formal interpretation of this statement we can be sure of its truth and it
should be considered as an axiom in our Zermelo theory. The reason is that
it is just a special case of the soundness of our theories which we intuitively
believe. On the other hand, investigating the formula more precisely, we will
notice that there are different levels of proofs in the statement, and if we
can ignore the order in the world of proofs, then it should be true or false
regardless the levels of proofs we are using. If we interpret all of the proofs as
proofs in the same level, say in the theory T , then the statement means that
T (TT⊥ → T⊥). Using Lo¨b’s theorem, it implies that TT⊥ which
contradicts with the intuitive condition that there are no proofs of ⊥. But if
we interpret the “provability” in the statement as the provability in T , the
provability as the provability in its meta-theory S and proof as a proof in
the meta-theory of S, say R, then it means that R proves ST⊥ → T⊥.
This is possible if R is strong enough to prove the soundness of S; a condition
that seems natural and acceptable. It actually is the informal reason behind
our belief in the intuitive truth of this theorem of IPC.
This observation shows that we can not ignore the natural order of implica-
tions in the statements. Hence, we can not follow the Zermelo approach in a
very natural way of ignoring orders in interpreting the implications. But is
there any way to deal with these kinds of referring problems in the Zermelo
approach? Can we handle it? In [1] we showed that by some natural tech-
niques, it is possible to use an untyped language to describe the hierarchical
world of proofs. However, we have to emphasize that those techniques make
the whole work too complicated to follow. For more information, see [1].
Another approach is the Russellian approach. In spite of the Zermelo
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approach, it is based on using a typed language to reflect the hierarchical
nature of the world in a very syntactical way. Here again, the main example
is set theory, in this case, the Russellian one. As it is well-known, it limits the
syntax of the language in a way that we can not use statements such as a ∈ b
in which the level of b is less than or equal to the level of a. Now, consider
using this approach for the world of proofs. It is clear that instead of just
one implication, we need a hierarchy of implications, {→n}
∞
n=0 to reflect the
hierarchical concept of provability. Moreover, we have to limit the formulas
in the language in a way that A→n B is a formula iff n is larger than all the
indices of the implications in A and B. It means that the implication →n
refers to a higher level than the implications in A or B. In the following, we
will persue the Russellian approach. Indeed, we will use the above mentioned
language to formalize the hierarchical world of proofs on the one hand, and
define the BHK interpretation as the intended interpretation of this language
on the other. Then, we will establish the soundness-completeness results
for some of the propositional logics with respect to their canonical BHK
interpretations. These logics can be considered as the description of different
kinds of behaviors of the hierarchies of provabilities.
2 Preliminaries
Our main strategy to prove the soundness-completeness theorems for our
propositional logics is reducing them to the soundness-completeness theo-
rems for their modal counterparts introduced in [2]. In this section we will
cover what we need from [2] to follow this strategy.
First of all we need a new modal language to capture the provability-based
behavior of hierarchies:
Definition 2.1. Consider the language of modal logics with infinitely many
modalities, {n}
∞
n=0, The set of formulas in this language, L

∞
, is defined as
the least set of expressions which includes all atomic formulas and is closed
under all boolean operations and also the following operation: If A ∈ L
∞
and n is bigger than all indices of boxes occurred in A then nA ∈ L

∞
. In
other words, A ∈ L
∞
, if A is a usual formula in the modal language and also
the index of any box is bigger than the indices of all other boxes in its scope.
The intuition behind this definition is that the outer box refers to the
provability predicate of a meta-theory and the inner boxes refer to the lower
theories in the hierarchy. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that the
situation in which a theory speaks about itself or higher theories, should be
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considered as a syntactical error.
After introducing the language, we need the intended semantics. The
following is a formalization of the combination of a real world which atomic
statements informally refer to, and the hierarchy of theories, meta-theories,
meta-meta-theories and so on to interpret the boxes in the language.
Definition 2.2. A provability model is a pair (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) where M is a
model of IΣ1 and {Tn}
∞
n=0 is a hierarchy of arithmetical r.e. theories such
that for any n, IΣ1 ⊆ Tn ⊆ Tn+1 provably in IΣ1.
We also need the notions of arithmetical substitution, evaluation of modal
formulas by substitutions and finally the satisfaction relation:
Definition 2.3. Let (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) be a provability model and A ∈ L

∞
be a
formula. Then by an arithmetical substitution σ, we mean a function from
atomic formulas to the set of arithmetical sentences. Moreover, by Aσ we
mean an arithmetical sentence which is resulted by substituting the atomic
formulas by σ and interpreting any n as the provability predicate of Tn.
The interpretation of boolean connectives are themselves. Moreover, if Γ is
a sequence of formulas Ai, by Γ
σ we mean the sequence of Aσi .
Definition 2.4. Let (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) be a provability model and A ∈ L

∞
be a
formula. Then we say (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A if for any arithmetical substitution
σ, M  Aσ. Moreover, if Γ and ∆ are sequences of formulas and C a class of
provability models, by C  Γ⇒ ∆, we mean that for any (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) ∈ C,
and for any arithmetical substitution σ, if M 
∧
Γσ, then M 
∨
∆σ.
So far, we have defined provability models to capture the informal hierar-
chical concept of provability and also we introduced an appropriate language
to reflect these models. Next is a definition of some of the natural modal
theories in this language to formalize some of the natural properties of hier-
archies:
Definition 2.5. Consider the following set of axioms:
(H) nA→ n+1A
(Kh) n(A→ B)→ (nA→ nB)
(4h) nA→ n+1nA
(Dh) ¬n⊥
(Lh) n+1(nA→ A)→ nA
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(Th) nA→ A
(5h) ¬nA→ n+1¬nA
Let X be a set of these axioms. By L(X) we mean the least set of formulas
in L
∞
, which contains all classical tautologies on formulas in L
∞
, includes
all instances of the set X and is closed under the following rules:
(MP) If A ∈ L(X) and A→ B ∈ L(X) then B ∈ L(X).
(NCh) If A ∈ L(X) then nA ∈ L(X).
Moreover, if Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L∞, by Γ ⊢L(X) A we mean that there exists a finite
set ∆ ⊆ Γ such that L(X) ⊢
∧
∆→ A.
Finally, we define K4h = L(H,Kh, 4h), KD4h = L(H,Kh, 4h,Dh), S4h =
L(H,Kh, 4h,Th), GLh = L(H,Kh, 4h,Lh), KD45h = L(H,Kh,Dh, 4h, 5h)
and S5h = L(H,Kh, 4h,Th, 5h).
Fortunately, some of these logics have a nice proof theoretic behavior.
For instance, the logics K4h, KD4h and S4h have reasonable sequent calculi
which have the cut elimination property. To introduce them, consider the
following set of rules:
Axioms:
A⇒ A ⊥ ⇒
Structural Rules:
Γ⇒ ∆
(wL)
Γ, A⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(wR)
Γ⇒ ∆, A
Γ, A, A⇒ ∆
(cL)
Γ, A⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A, A
(cR)
Γ⇒ ∆, A
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, A Γ1, A⇒ ∆1
(cut)
Γ0,Γ1 ⇒ ∆0,∆1
Propositional Rules:
Γ0, A⇒ ∆0 Γ1, B ⇒ ∆1
∨L
Γ0,Γ1, A ∨ B ⇒ ∆0,∆1
Γ⇒ ∆, Ai
∨R (i = 0, 1)
Γ⇒ ∆, A0 ∨ A1
Γ, Ai ⇒ ∆
∧L (i = 0, 1)
Γ, A0 ∧ A1 ⇒ ∆, C
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, A Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, B
∧R
Γ0,Γ1 ⇒ ∆0,∆1, A ∧B
Γ0 ⇒ A,∆0 Γ1, B ⇒ ∆1, C
→ L
Γ0,Γ1, A→ B ⇒ ∆0,∆1, C
Γ, A⇒ B,∆
→ R
Γ⇒ ∆, A→ B
Γ⇒ ∆, A
¬L
Γ,¬A⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆
¬R
Γ⇒ ∆,¬A
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Modal Rules:
{σr}r∈R, {γi,niγi}i∈I ⇒ A
4h
R
{nσr}r∈R, {niγi}i∈I ⇒ nA
{σr}r∈R, {γi,niγi}i∈I ⇒
Dh
R
{nσr}r∈R, {niγi}i∈I ⇒
Γ, A⇒ ∆
hL
Γ,nA⇒ ∆
{σr}r∈R, {niγi}i∈I ⇒ A
Sh
R
{nσr}r∈R, {niγi}i∈I ⇒ nA
The condition of applying the rules 4hR, DhR and ShR is that for all
i ∈ I, ni < n.
The system G(K4h) is the system that consists of the axioms, structural
rules, propositional rules and the modal rule 4hR. G(KD4h) is G(K4h)
plus the rule DhR and finally, G(S4h) is the system G(K4h) when we re-
place the rule 4hR by ShR and add the rule hL.
Theorem 2.6. [2] The systems G(K4h), G(KD4h) and G(S4h) are equiv-
alent to the logics K4h, KD4h and S4h, respectively. Moreover, all of these
sequent calculi have the cut elimination property.
Using these sequent calculi we also proved the strong disjunction property.
Definition 2.7. Logic L has the strong disjunction property if for all for-
mulas nA and mB, if L ⊢ nA ∨mB then L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B.
Theorem 2.8. (Strong disjunction property) [2] All of the logicsK4h, KD4h,
S4h and GLh have strong disjunction property.
And finally, the natural classes of provability models and the soundness-
completeness theorem:
Definition 2.9. (i) The class of all provability models will be denoted by
PrM.
(ii) A provability model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is called consistent if for any n, M
thinks that Tn is consistent and Tn+1 ⊢ Cons(Tn), i.e. M  Cons(Tn)
and M  PrTn+1(Cons(Tn)). Moreover, the class of all consistent prov-
ability models will be denoted by Cons.
(iii) A provability model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is reflexive if for any n, M thinks
that Tn is sound and Tn+1 ⊢ Rfn(Tn), i.e. M  PrTn(A) → A and
M  PrTn+1(PrTn(A) → A) for any sentence A. Moreover, the class of
all reflexive provability models will be denoted by Ref .
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(iv) A provability model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is constant if for any n and m,
(M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) thinks that Tn = Tm, i.e. M  PrTm(A) ↔ PrTn(A)
and M  PrT0(PrTm(A) ↔ PrTn(A)) for any sentence A. The class of
all constant provability models will be denoted by Cst.
Theorem 2.10. (Soundness-Completeness)[2]
(i) Γ ⊢K4h A iff PrM  Γ⇒ A.
(ii) Γ ⊢KD4h A iff Cons  Γ⇒ A.
(iii) Γ ⊢S4h A iff Ref  Γ⇒ A.
(iv) Γ ⊢GLh A iff Cst  Γ⇒ A.
3 Russellian Propositional Logics
In this section we will define an appropriate language to capture the hierar-
chical nature of intuitionism and its BHK interpretation. Then we will define
some natural theories in this language and finally we will use the Go¨del trans-
lation to find a connection between these propositional logics and the modal
systems introduced in the Preliminaries.
Definition 3.1. Consider the language of propositional logics in which the
implication is replaced by infinitely many implications, {→n}
∞
n=1. Define
the set of formulas, L∞, as the least set of expressions that includes all
atomic variables, ⊤ and ⊥, closed under conjunction and disjunction and
finally closed under the following operation: If A,B ∈ L∞, and n is strictly
greater than all numbers occurring as indices of implications in A and B,
then A→n B ∈ L∞.
Remark 3.2. For the simplicity, negations are not assumed as primitives in
the language. But for any type of implication, we can define ¬nA as A→n ⊥.
Just like the modal language introduced in the Preliminaries, we assume
that the indices of implications should be in an increasing order. The reason
again is that we think that the situation in which a theory speaks about
itself or the higher levels in the hierarchy should be considered as a syn-
tactical error. This is actually the essence of the Russellian approach dis-
cussed in the Introduction. To have an example, notice that the expression
((p →1 q) ∧ r) →2 s is a formula in the language L∞, while the expression
(p →1 (q →1 r)) is not. The reason is that in the second expression the
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theory T1 speaks about the provability behavior of itself which is not valid.
To introduce some formal systems in this language, consider the following
set of natural deduction rules:
Propositional Rules:
A B
∧I
A ∧B
A ∧ B
∧E
A
A ∧B
∧E
B
A
∨I
A ∨ B
B
∨I
A ∨ B A ∨ B
[A]
D
C
[B]
D′
C
∨E
C
[A]
D
B
→ I
A→n B
⊥
⊥
A
Formalized Rules:
A→n B A→n C
(∧I)f
A→n B ∧ C
A→n C B →n C
(∨E)f
A ∨ B →n C
A→n B B →n C
trf
A→n C
Structural Rules:
A
[A]
D
B
tr
B
A→n B
H
A→m B
Moreover, consider the following set of rules:
A ¬nA
C
⊥
A A→n B
R
B
D
A ∨ ¬nA
(A ∧ (A→n B))→n+1 B
L
A→n B
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The condition for the rule H is that m ≥ n and the condition of applying
the rule→ I is that n should be strictly greater than all the indices occurred
in the hypothesis of the deduction, including A.
The logic BPCh is defined as the system consists of the propositional
rules, the structural rules and the formalized rules. Then EBPCh is defined
as BPCh+C, FPLh is defined as BPCh+L, IPCh is defined as BPCh+R
and finally CPCh is defined as IPCh +D.
Remark 3.3. Consider the following rules:
⊤ →n ⊥
C′
⊥
⊤ →n A
R′
A
It is possible to define EBPCh asBPCh+D
′ and define IPCh asBPCh+R
′.
It is clear thatD′ and R′ are special cases ofD and R, respectively. Therefore
it remains to show that D′ and R′ can simulate D and R, respectively. The
following proofs show that it is the case:
A
⊤ →n A A→n ⊥
⊤ →n ⊥
C′
⊥
A
⊤ →n A A→n B
⊤ →n B
R′
B
Remark 3.4. The usual logics BPC, EBPC, IPC and CPC are defined
just like their counterparts replacing all →n by →. (See [5], [3].) Moreover,
the logic FPL is defined as BPC plus the following rule (See [5]):
(⊤ → A)→ A
⊤ → A
It is also possible to define FPL as BPC plus the rule:
(A ∧ (A→ B))→ B
A→ B
The equivalence of these two definitions, is based on the fact that the first
rule is a special case of the second rule when we have A = ⊤ and the follow-
ing proof which shows that the first is also powerful enough to simulate the
second:
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A→ ⊤
[⊤ → (A→ B)]2
[A]1
⊤ → A
⊤ → (A ∧ (A→ B)) [(A ∧ (A→ B))→ B]3
⊤ → B
A→ B
→ I2
(⊤ → (A→ B))→ (A→ B)
⊤ → (A→ B)
(∗)
A→ B
→ I1
A→ ((A→ B))
A→ (A ∧ (A→ B)) [(A ∧ (A→ B))→ B]3
(A→ B)
Notice that the double lines mean simple sub-proofs that we do not mention
and (∗) is the sub-proof which proves
A, (⊤ → (A→ B)), ((A ∧ (A→ B))→ B) ⊢ A→ B
Remark 3.5. In the untyped case of logics introduced in Remark 3.4, there
is no need to add the rule tr, simply because it is admissible. It is enough
to put a proof for Γ, A ⊢ B under the proof of Γ′ ⊢ A to have a proof for
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ B. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the typed version. The
reason is simple: If we put the proof of Γ′ ⊢ A under the proof of Γ, A ⊢ B
it means that we keep the structure of two proofs, by changing the premises
to the set Γ ∪ Γ′. But then it is possible that some applications of the rule
→ I become invalid simply because it is possible to have formulas in the set
Γ′ with greater indices. To have an example, consider the following trees:
p ∧ (⊤ →2 q)
p
[p]
(∗)
⊤ →1 p
tr
⊤ →1 p
p ∧ (⊤ →2 q)
p
(∗∗)
⊤ →1 p
The left tree is a valid proof while the right one is not. The reason is
that in applying the rule → I in (∗∗), the index 1 is not greater than all the
indices occurring in the premises which is 2, in this case. But in the left tree,
applying → I in (∗) is valid because there is no index in the premises which
in this case is the empty set.
In the following we will define the provability interpretation (BHK inter-
pretation) of the statements in the propositional language L∞:
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Definition 3.6. Let (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) be a provability model and A ∈ L∞ a
formula. Then by an arithmetical substitution σ we mean a function from
atomic formulas to the set of arithmetical sentences. Moreover, define Aσ as
follows:
(i) If p is an atomic formula, pσ = Pr0(σ(p)). Moreover, ⊤
σ = Pr0(⊤) and
⊥σ = Pr0(⊥).
(ii) (B ◦ C)σ = Bσ ◦ Cσ for all ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}.
(iii) (A→n B)
σ = Prn(A
σ → Bσ).
Moreover, if Γ is a sequence of formulas Ai, by Γ
σ we mean the sequence of
Aσi .
Definition 3.7. Let (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) be a provability model and A ∈ L∞ a
formula. Then we say (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A if for any arithmetical substitution
σ, M  Aσ. Moreover, if Γ and ∆ are sequences of formulas and C a class of
provability models, by C  Γ⇒ ∆, we mean that for any (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) ∈ C,
and for any arithmetical substitution σ, if M 
∧
Γσ, then M 
∨
∆σ.
Let us illuminate this definition by an example:
Example 3.8. Consider the pair (N, {Tn}
∞
n=0) in which T0 = PA and Tn+1 =
Tn + Rfn(Tn). First of all, it is easy to check that this pair is a reflexive
provability model. Secondly, we want to show that this model satisfies the
statement (A ∧ (A→n B))→n+1 B. To show this fact, suppose that σ is an
arbitrary arithmetical substitution, then we have to show
N  n+1(A
σ ∧n(A
σ → Bσ)→ Bσ)
which holds because Tn+1 has the reflection principle for the theory Tn. Spe-
cially, Tn+1 ⊢ n(A
σ → Bσ)→ (Aσ → Bσ).
In the remaining part of this section we will introduce the Go¨del transla-
tion b : L∞ → L

∞
and we will show its soundness-completeness property.
Definition 3.9. The translation b : L∞ → L

∞
is defined as follows:
(i) pb = 0p, ⊤
b = 0⊤ and ⊥
b = 0⊥.
(ii) (A ∧B)b = Ab ∧Bb
(iii) (A ∨ B)b = Ab ∨Bb
(iv) (A→n B)
b = n(A
b → Bb)
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Remark 3.10. It is possible to have a similar translation b′ : L → L which
is like the translation b except in the implicational case which is defined as
(A→ B)b
′
= (Ab
′
→ Bb
′
). Since it is possible to recognize from the context
that which translation we are using, we will use b for b′ as well.
First we need the following important lemma which intuitively states that
all translated formulas are boxed inherently:
Lemma 3.11. K4h ⊢ A
b → nA
b.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. If A is an atom,
⊤ or ⊥, we have Ab = 0(A). Therefore, by axiom 4h, we have K4h ⊢
0A → n0A. For conjunction, by IH we have K4h ⊢ B
b → nB
b and
K4h ⊢ C
b → nC
b, therefore, we have K4h ⊢ B
b ∧ Cb → n(B
b ∧ Cb). For
disjunction, by IH, we have K4h ⊢ B
b → nB
b and K4h ⊢ C
b → nC
b.
Therefore, K4h ⊢ B
b∨Cb → nB
b∨nC
b and since K4h ⊢ nB
b∨nC
b →
n(B
b ∨Cb), we have the claim. For the implication B →m C, again by 4h,
we have K4h ⊢ m(B
b → Cb)→ nm(B
b → Cb).
We need the following theorems about the systems FPL, GL, FPLh and
GLh. The strategy is reducing the soundness-completeness of the translation
b between FPLh and GLh to the soundness-completeness between FPL and
GL.
Theorem 3.12. [5] Γ ⊢FPL A iff Γ
b ⊢GL A
b.
Definition 3.13. Let A be a usual propositional formula. By a witness w for
A we mean an assignment which assigns natural numbers to implications in a
way that if n is assigned to the implication in A→ B then n should be strictly
greater than all numbers assigned to the implications in A and B. Moreover,
by A(w) we mean a formula in L∞ substituting any occurrence of implication
with →n when n is a number which w assigns to that occurrence. Moreover,
by the forgetful translation f : L∞ → L we mean a function which translates
atomic formulas, conjunctions and disjunctions to themselves and sends →n
to →. Notice that there exists a witness w for Af such that Af (w) = A.
Lemma 3.14. (i) For any A ∈ L∞ and any natural numbers m,n greater
than all the indices in A and B, A→m B ⊢FPLh A→n B.
(ii) For any A ∈ L and any witnesses u and v for A, A(u) ⊢FPLh A(v)
Proof. For (i) it is enough to show that if n is greater than all indices in A
and B, A →n+1 B ⊢FPLh A →n B. We have A →n+1 B ⊢FPLh (A ∧ (A →n
B)→n+1 B). By the rule L
(A ∧ (A→n B)→n+1 B) ⊢FPLh A→n B
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hence A→n+1 B ⊢FPLh A→n B.
For (ii). Use induction on A. The atomic case and the case for conjunction
and disjunction are easy to check. For the implicational case assume A =
B → C. Then we know that u = (u′, n, u′′) and v = (v′, m, v′′) such that
n is bigger than all numbers in u′ and u′′ and also m is bigger than all
numbers in v′ and v′′. Pick k = max{m,n}. By IH, B(v′) ⊢FPLh B(u
′)
and C(u′′) ⊢FPLh C(v
′′) Therefore, FPLh ⊢ B(v
′) →k B(u
′) and FPLh ⊢
C(u′′) →k C(v
′′). By trf we have B(u
′) →k C(u
′′) ⊢FPLh B(v
′) →k C(v
′′).
On the other hand by (i) we have B(u′) →n C(u
′′) ⊢FPLh B(u
′) →k C(u
′′)
and B(v′) →k C(v
′′) ⊢FPLh B(v
′) →m C(v
′′) hence B(u′) →n C(u
′′) ⊢FPLh
B(v′)→m C(v
′′).
Theorem 3.15. (i) If Γ ⊢FPLh A then Γ
f ⊢FPL A
f .
(ii) Let Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L be a set of usual propositional formulas and w and
w′ are witnesses for Γ and A respectively, then if Γ ⊢FPL A then
Γ(w) ⊢FPLh A(w
′).
Proof. (i) is clear by the Remark 3.4. For (ii), use induction on the length
of the proof of A. The important cases are the axiom case, the case of → I
and the case of trf .
1. For the axiom case, we have A ∈ Γ. Assume that the witness for A in
Γ is u, then by Theorem 3.14, A(u) ⊢FPLh A(w
′) which completes the proof.
2. For the→ I case, if w = (u, n, v) then by IH, we know that Γ(w), B(u) ⊢FPLh
C(v). Pick k bigger than all numbers in w, u and v. Then by → I in FPLh
we have Γ(w) ⊢FPLh B(u) →k C(v). Now by Theorem 3.14, we will have
Γ(w) ⊢FPLh B(u)→n C(v).
3. For the tr case, assume that w′ = (u, n, v). Pick y as a witness for C
and k bigger than all numbers in w, w′ and y. By IH, we have Γ(w) ⊢FPLh
B(u)→k C(y) and Γ(w) ⊢FPL C(y)→k D(v), then by trf in FPLh we have
Γ(w) ⊢FPLh B(u) →k D(v). Finally by using the Theorem 3.14 part (i),
Γ(w) ⊢FPLh B(u)→n D(v).
It is time to prove the soundness-completeness of the translation b.
Theorem 3.16. (Soundness-completeness of b)
(i) Γ ⊢BPCh A iff Γ
b ⊢K4h A
b.
(ii) Γ ⊢EBPCh A iff Γ
b ⊢KD4h A
b.
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(iii) Γ ⊢IPCh A iff Γ
b ⊢S4h A
b.
(iv) Γ ⊢FPLh A iff Γ
b ⊢GLh A
b.
Proof. (Soundness of the translation b). The proof is by induction on the
length of the proofs in the propositional logics. More precisely, if we denote
the propositional logic by L and its modal counterpart by L, then we will
show that if Γ ⊢L A then L ⊢
∧
Γb → Ab.
1. For the rules ∧I, ∧E, ∨I and ∨E, the claim is easy to check. It is
just an easy consequence of the fact that the translation b commutes with
conjunctions and disjunctions.
The following cases for the rules → I, ⊥ and the formalized rules are
shown for K4h but the proof for the other modal logics are the same.
2. For the rule → I, by IH, we have L ⊢
∧
Γb ∧ Ab → Bb. Therefore,
L ⊢
∧
Γb → (Ab → Bb). Since n is bigger than all the indices in the
statement
∧
Γb → (Ab → Bb), by necessitation, we have
L ⊢ n(
∧
Γb → (Ab → Bb))
By the use of the axiom Kh, we have
L ⊢ n(
∧
Γb)→ n(A
b → Bb)
By Lemma 3.11, we have
L ⊢
∧
Γb → n(
∧
Γb) (∗)
therefore, by (∗) and the definition of b,
L ⊢
∧
Γb → (A→n B)
b
3. For the rule ⊥, by induction on A we will show that L ⊢ 0⊥ → A
b.
For the atomic case, we have L ⊢ ⊥ → p, therefore by necessitation and
the axiom Kh we have L ⊢ 0⊥ → 0p which is what we wanted. The
conjunction and dijunction cases are easy to check. For the implication, we
have L ⊢ ⊥ → (A
b → Bb). Hence, L ⊢ n⊥ → n(A
b → Bb). Since
0 ≤ n, L ⊢ 0⊥ → n⊥, thus L ⊢ 0⊥ → (A→n B)
b.
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For the rule tr, by IH if L ⊢
∧
Γb → Ab and L ⊢
∧
Γ′b∧Ab → Bb, then
we obviously have L ⊢
∧
Γb ∧
∧
Γ′b → Bb.
4. The case of formalized ∧I, formalized ∨E and tr. For the formalized
∧I, by IH, we have
L ⊢
∧
Γb → n(A
b → Bb)
and
L ⊢
∧
Γb → n(A
b → Cb)
therefore, by some applications of the axiom Kh and the modus ponens rule,
we have
L ⊢
∧
Γb → n(A
b → Bb ∧ Cb)
which completes the proof. The case for formalized ∨E and tr are the same.
5. For the rule C, by IH, we have
KD4h ⊢
∧
Γb → n(A
b → 0⊥) ∧ A
b
By Lemma 3.11, K4h ⊢ A
b → nA
b and
KD4h ⊢ n(0⊥ ↔ ⊥)
we have
KD4h ⊢
∧
Γb → n⊥
and since KD4h ⊢ n⊥ → ⊥ and KD4h ⊢ ⊥ → 0⊥ then
KD4h ⊢
∧
Γb → 0⊥
For the rule R by IH, we have
S4h ⊢
∧
Γb → n(A
b → Bb) ∧Ab
By Lemma 3.11, K4h ⊢ A
b → nA
b, which means
S4h ⊢
∧
Γb → nB
b
we know that S4 ⊢ nB
b → Bb, hence
S4h ⊢
∧
Γb → Bb
And finally for the rule, L, by IH
GLh ⊢ n+1(A
b ∧n(A→ B)→ B
b)
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which means
GLh ⊢ n+1(n(A
b → Bb)→ (Ab → Bb))
therefore
GLh ⊢ n(A
b → Bb)
hence GLh ⊢ (A→n B)
b.
Proof. (Completeness of the translation b.) For the completeness part for the
logics BPCh, EBPCh and IPCh we will use the sequent calculi for K4h,
KD4h and S4h as introduced in the Preliminaries. Moreover, the structure
of the proof for all of these logics are the same. Therefore, we will prove
their completeness theorems simultaneously. To achieve this goal, denote
the propositional logic by L, its modal counterpart by L and the sequent
calculi for L by G(L). Assume that Γ
b ⊢L A
b. Then G(L) ⊢ Γ
b ⇒ Ab.
Hence, there is a cut-free proof for Γb ⇒ Ab. Call it pi. It is obvious that
all the formulas occurring in pi are sub-formulas of Ab or sub-formulas of the
elements of Γb. We know that all of these sub-formulas have the following
forms: Bb; Bb → Cb and atoms p. (⊤ and ⊥ are considered as atomic in this
proof.) Therefore, every sequent in pi has the following form:
Γb, {Bbi → C
b
i }i∈I , {pj}j∈J ⇒ ∆
b, {Dbr → E
b
r}r∈R, {qs}s∈S
We will prove the following claim:
Claim. If
G(L) ⊢ Γ
b, {Bbi → C
b
i }i∈I , {pj}j∈J ⇒ ∆
b, {Dbr → E
b
r}r∈R, {qs}s∈S
then for any X ⊆ I
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X ⊢L
∨
{∆, {qs}s∈S, {Er}r∈R, {Bi}i/∈X}
The proof is by induction on the length of the cut-free proof in G(L).
The case for axioms and structural rules are easy to check. If the last rule
is a conjunction or a disjunction rule, then the main formula is in the first
form. Then since it is possible to simulate all conjunction and disjunction
rules in BPCh, the case of conjunction and disjunction rules are also easy
to check. If the last rule is an implication rule, since we define our claim up
to using implicational rules, there is nothing to prove in this case. Finally, if
the last rule is a modal rule, then, we have different cases:
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1. The case L = K4h. If the last rule is a modal rule, based on the
form of the formulas and the fact that in those three forms a boxed formula
should have the first form, we have two cases. The first case is when the
boxed formula in the right side has the form n(D
b → Eb). The second case
is when the formula has the form 0p. For the first case, the last rule has
the following form:
{F br → G
b
r}r∈R, {pj,0pj}j∈J , {B
b
i → C
b
i ,ni(B
b
i → C
b
i )}i∈I ⇒ D
b → Eb
n({F
b
r → G
b
r)}r∈R, {0pj}j∈J , {ni(B
b
i → C
b
i )}i∈I ⇒ n(D
b → Eb)
By IH and for any X ⊆ I and Y ⊆ R we have
{Gr}r∈Y , {pj}j∈J , {Bi →ni Ci}i∈I , {Ci}i∈X , D ⊢BPCh {Fr}r /∈Y , {Bi}i/∈X , E
and we want to prove
{Fr →n Gr}r∈R, {pj}j∈J , {Bi →ni Ci}i∈I ⊢BPCh D →n E.
First notice that we know n > ni, therefore by the rule → I the following is
provable by Σ = {pj}j∈J ∪ {Bi →ni Ci}i∈I
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧
∧
{Ci}i∈X ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨
∨
{Bi}i/∈X ∨ E.
Fix i ∈ I and also fix some Z ⊆ I − {i}. Both of the following statements
are theorems of Σ:
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧
∧
{Ci}i∈Z ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨
∨
{Bi}i/∈Z ∨Bi ∨ E
and
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧
∧
{Ci}i∈Z ∧Ci ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨
∨
{Bi}i/∈Z ∨ E.
Since Σ ⊢ Bi →ni Ci by using the rule H and the fact that ni < n, we will
have Σ ⊢ Bi →n Ci. Then by using appropriate formalized rules we have
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧
∧
{Ci}i∈Z ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨
∨
{Bi}i/∈Z ∨ E
provable by Σ in BPCh. By iterating this method we can eliminate all the
elements in I and finally for any Y ⊆ R, we have
Σ ⊢BPCh
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨ E.
Define Σ′ = Σ + {Fr →n Gr}r∈R. Therefore for any any Y ⊆ R
Σ′ ⊢BPCh
∧
{Gr}r∈Y ∧D →n
∨
{Fr}r /∈Y ∨ E
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but Σ′ ⊢BPCh Fr →n Gr, hence by the same method as above we can elimi-
nate R and hence we will have
Σ′ ⊢ D →n E
which is what we wanted to prove.
If the boxed formula in the right side of the rule is 0p, since 0 is the
lowest possible index, the rule has the following form:
{pj}j∈J ⇒ p
{0pj}j∈J ⇒ 0p
therefore, by IH, {pj}j∈J ⊢BPCh p, which is what we wanted.
2. The case L = KD4h. If the last rule is 4hR, the proof is the same as
the case 1. If the last rule is DhR, then everything in the proof is the same
as the proof for case 1 when we put D = ⊤ and E = ⊥. Therefore, we have
{pj}j∈J , {Bi →ni Ci}i∈I , {Fr →n Gr}r∈R ⊢EBPCh ⊤ →n ⊥.
Then by the rule C, we will have
{pj}j∈J , {Bi →ni Ci}i∈I , {Fr →n Gr}r∈R ⊢EBPCh ⊥
which is what we wanted.
3. The case L = S4h. If the last rule is ShR, then the proof is similar to
the case 1. If the last rule is hL, then there are two cases. First, the case in
which the boxed formula has the form n(B
b → Cb). And the second case
in which the boxed formula has the form 0p. For the first case, the rule
should have the following form:
Γb, {Bbi → C
b
i }i∈I , {pj}j∈J , B
b → Cb ⇒ ∆b, {Dbr → E
b
r}r∈R, {qs}s∈S
Γb, {Bbi → C
b
i }i∈I , {pj}j∈J ,m(B
b → Cb)⇒ ∆b, {Dbr → E
b
r}r∈R, {qs}s∈S
Therefore by IH, for any X ⊆ I and Y ⊆ R we have
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X , C ⊢IPCh
∨
{∆, {qs}s∈S, {Er}r∈R, {Bi}i/∈X}
and
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X ⊢IPCh B ∨
∨
{∆, {qs}s∈S, {Er}r∈R, {Bi}i/∈X}.
Since
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X , B →m C ⊢IPCh B →m C
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and we have B →m C,B ⊢IPCh C, then
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X ⊢IPCh C ∨
∨
{∆, {qs}s∈S, {Er}r∈R, {Bi}i/∈X}.
By using some appropriate formalized rule and tr on C we will have
Γ, {pj}j∈J , {Dr}r∈R, {Ci}i∈X , B →m C ⊢IPCh
∨
{∆, {qs}s∈S, {Er}r∈R, {Bi}i/∈X}
which is what we wanted. The second case is straightforward by IH.
After proving the claim, the theorem is an easy consequence: Since there
is a proof of Γb ⇒ Ab in G(L), then by claim we have Γ ⊢L A.
For the logic GLh, if Γ
b ⊢GLh A
b then by using the forgetful translation,
which forgets the indices of the boxes, we will have (Γb)f ⊢GL (A
b)f . Since
for any formula X ∈ L∞, (X
b)f = (Xf )b, hence (Γf)b ⊢GL (A
f )b. Therefore
by completeness of b between GL and FPL, we have Γf ⊢FPL A
f . Define
wΓ and wA such that Γ
f (wΓ) = Γ and A
f(wA) = A. Then by Theorem 3.15
we have Γf(wΓ) ⊢FPLh A
f (wA) which completes the proof.
And the final part of this section contains the proof of the fact that
these propositional logics have the disjunction property, as we expect for any
constructive logic:
Theorem 3.17. All of the logics BPCh, EBPCh, IPCh and FPLh have
disjunction property.
Proof. The proof for all of these logics are the same. Assume L is one of
the mentioned propositional logics, and L is its modal counterpart. Then
if L ⊢ A ∨ B then by soundness of the translation b, L ⊢ A
b ∨ Bb. Then,
by Lemma 3.11, we have L ⊢ nA
b ∨mB
b for some big enough m and n.
Then by strong disjunction property for L, Theorem 2.8, we have: L ⊢ A
b
or L ⊢ B
b. Therefore, by completeness of the translation b, we will have
L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B.
4 Soundness-Completeness Theorems
In this section we will prove the soundness-completeness theorems for propo-
sitional logics that we introduced in the previous section. To do so, we have
to define the notion of a BHK model. It is clear that formalizing the BHK
interpretation needs formalizing two different kinds of conditions: The first
is the way that the BHK interpretation interprets propositional connectives
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and the second is the consistency assumption which states that there is no
proof for inconsistency. For the first one, we defined the satisfaction relation
between provability models and propositional formulas exactly as what the
BHK interpretation demands. For the second condition, we need the follow-
ing discussion: First of all, it seems clear that the natural formalization of
this condition is the consistency assumption on the provability model which
states that M  ¬Prn(⊥) for all n ≥ 0. But we have to notice that in the
intuitionistic tradition everything should be also reflected in the level of prov-
ability. To implement this idea, there are two possible natural ways: The
first one is assuming that the meta-theory of Tn is strong enough to prove its
consistency, i.e. M  Prn+1(¬Prn(⊥)). This statement seems totally natural
to assume, but the cost is a lot. In fact, it makes the BHK interpretation
much more limited than what we expected. For instance, on the one hand,
the statement (⊤ →n ⊥) →n+1 ⊥ would be valid in all the BHK models
which means that BHK  (⊤ →n ⊥) →n+1 ⊥ and on the other hand,
(⊤ →n ⊥)→n+1 ⊥ is the essential axiom of EBPCh. Therefore, there is no
BHK characterization of logics below EBPCh which is not what we expected.
The second approach is based on assuming a weaker version which states that
Tn+1 can not prove the inconsistency of Tn, i.e M  ¬Prn+1(Prn(⊥)) for all
n ≥ 0. This formalization seems more liberal than the first one, and we will
choose it as our formalization. Notice that for the logics above EBPCh, this
condition is not needed, since the provability models are strong enough to
satisfy it automatically.
Definition 4.1. A provability model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is called a BHK model
if for all n ≥ 0, M  ¬Prn+1(Prn(⊥)). We will denote the class of all BHK
models by BHK and the class of all constant BHK models by cBHK.
Theorem 4.2. (Soundness-Completeness)
(i) Γ ⊢BPCh A iff PrM  Γ⇒ A. Moreover, BPCh ⊢ A iff BHK  A.
(ii) Γ ⊢EBPCh A iff Cons  Γ⇒ A.
(iii) Γ ⊢IPCh A iff Ref  Γ⇒ A.
(iv) Γ ⊢FPLh A iff Cst  Γ⇒ A. Moreover, FPLh ⊢ A iff cBHK  A.
(v) There is no BHK model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) such that (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  CPCh.
Proof. First of all notice that for any formula A ∈ L∞ and any provability
model (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0), (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A is equivalent to (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A
b
by definition. Therefore (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are easy consequences of the
Theorem 3.16 and the soundness-completeness theorem of the corresponding
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modal logics (Theorem 2.10). The remaining part is the completeness the-
orem for the classes BHK and cBHK for BPCh and FPLh, respectively.
For BPCh, define ∆ as the set consisting of all instances of the formula
¬n+1n⊥ for any n ≥ 0. Notice that (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  ∆, iff (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is
a BHK model. Since (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A is equivalent to (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  A
b,
and since BHK  A, hence PrM  ∆ ⇒ Ab. By completeness of K4h, we
have ∆ ⊢K4h A
b. Therefore, there are finite instances of the formulas in ∆
such that {¬ni+1ni⊥}
r
i=0 ⊢K4h A
b. Hence,
K4h ⊢ (
r∨
i=0
ni+1ni⊥ ∨ A
b).
Since by the axiom H we can increase ni’s, w.l.o.g assume ni > 0. Moreover
we haveK4h ⊢ ni+1ni⊥ → ni+1ni0⊥ and also we know that (⊤ →ni+1
(⊤ →ni ⊥))
b is equivalent to ni+1ni0⊥ provably in K4h, hence
K4h ⊢ (
r∨
i=0
(⊤ →ni+1 (⊤ →ni ⊥)) ∨ A)
b
and by completeness of the translation b, Theorem 3.16, we have
BPCh ⊢ (
r∨
i=0
(⊤ →ni+1 (⊤ →ni ⊥)) ∨A).
By the disjunction property of BPCh, Theorem 3.17, we have BPCh ⊢ A
or for some i, BPCh ⊢ (⊤ →ni+1 (⊤ →ni ⊥)). The latter is impossi-
ble because if BPCh ⊢ (⊤ →ni+1 (⊤ →ni ⊥)) then by the soundness of
BPC, the formula (⊤ →ni+1 (⊤ →ni ⊥)) should be true in the provabil-
ity model (N, {IΣ1}
∞
n=0). It means that N  Prni+1(Prni(Pr0(⊥))). Hence,
IΣ1 ⊢ PrIΣ1(PrIΣ1(⊥)) which also means that IΣ1 ⊢ ⊥ which is not the case.
Hence, BPCh ⊢ A. The case for FPLh is exactly the same.
For (v), we will prove the claim by contradiction. Firstly, we want to
show that the following two statements hold:
(i) M thinks that T2 ⊢ Pr1(Pr0(⊥)) → Pr0(⊥) (a weak version of the
provability of the consistency assumption).
(ii) For any arithmetical statement φ, M thinks
¬Pr0(φ)→ Pr1(Pr0(φ)→ Pr0(⊥))
(a weak version of the axiom 5h).
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For (i), consider the formula (⊤ →1 ⊥) →2 ⊥. Since it is a theorem of
CPCh, then
(M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  Pr2(Pr1(Pr0(⊥))→ Pr0(⊥))
and therefore, we will have (i).
Secondly, we know CPCh ⊢ p∨¬1p. Hence, for any arithmetical substitu-
tion σ we have (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0)  Pr0(p
σ)∨Pr1(Pr0(p
σ)→ Pr0(⊥)). Therefore,
if we assume pσ = φ, then (ii) follows.
Using these two statements, we will reach the contradiction. First of all,
to simplify the proof, we will use Pr(A) for PrS in which S = T1+Cons(T0).
Put φ = Pr(⊥), then (ii) would be equivalent to
M  ¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))→ Pr(¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))).
On other hand by the formalized Σ1-completeness, we have
IΣ1 ⊢ ¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))→ ¬Pr(⊥),
hence,
S ⊢ ¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))→ ¬Pr(⊥).
Moreover, by Σ1-completeness, we have
IΣ1 ⊢ Pr(¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))→ ¬Pr(⊥)).
Therefore,
IΣ1 ⊢ Pr(¬Pr0(Pr(⊥)))→ Pr(¬Pr(⊥)).
And since M  IΣ1, we have
M  ¬Pr0(Pr(⊥))→ Pr(¬Pr(⊥)).
Based on Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem formalized in IΣ1, we can
conclude
IΣ1 ⊢ ¬Pr(⊥)→ ¬Pr(¬Pr(⊥)).
On the other hand, since (M, {Tn}
∞
n=0) is a BHK model, we have M 
¬Pr1(Pr0(⊥)), hence M  ¬Pr(⊥). Since M  IΣ1, M  ¬Pr(¬Pr(⊥
)). Therefore, M  Pr0(Pr(⊥)) and thus by the definition of S we have
M  Pr0(Pr1(Pr0(⊥))). By (i), M  Pr2(Pr1(Pr0(⊥)) → Pr0(⊥)). Since
M  Pr0(Pr1(Pr0(⊥))), we have M  Pr2(Pr0(⊥)). Therefore, we have
M  Pr2(Pr1(⊥)) which contradicts with the condition of being a BHK
model. Therefore, we reach a contradiction and it proves the theorem.
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